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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ANTITRUST LAW-DUAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS-MANUFAC-
TURER-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS ON DISTRIBUTORS REQUIRE RULE OF
REASON ANALYSIS. Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 119 (1981). Liq-
uid Carbonic Corporation (Liquid) manufactured industrial gas prod-
ucts and distributed such products through independent distributors
and direct sales.' Red Diamond Supply (Red Diamond), one of Liq-
uid's independent dealers, brought suit under federal2 and state3 anti-
trust statutes, alleging that Liquid had conspired with its independent
distributors4 to maintain territorial and customer restrictions on the
sale of Liquid's products in New Orleans. In addition, Red Diamond
alleged that its failure to abide by these restrictions caused its termina-
tion as a Liquid distributor.' The district court instructed the jury that
territorial and customer restraints imposed by a dual distributor are
horizontal market allocations because the manufacturer sells its prod-
1. Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. CL 119 (1981). A marketing network using two separate distribution channels is a
dual distribution system. Dual distribution systems operate in many different forms, including
those in which the manufacturer distributes products through independent distributors and com-
pany-owned distributors (branch outlets), distributors in separate markets (sale of home appli-
ances to retail outlets and to home builders), and two competing product lines (sale under
trademarked name and under a private brand name). See Slowey, Dual Distributiox Drfnition,
Legislative BackgroundAnd Specic Attempts At Regulation, 48 ANTITRUST L.. 1799 (1981).
2. Red Diamond alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides: "Every contract, combination, in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations is declared to be illegal." Section 2 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), provides:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty .... " Id.
3. The primary state claim arose under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.122 (West 1965), which is
similar to the provisions of § I of the Sherman Act. See note 2 supra. Section 51.122 provides:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce in this state is illegal .... ." Red Diamond alleged also that Liquid's practices
violated the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 51.1405 (West Supp. 1982).
4. 637 F.2d at 1002. Red Diamond named two of Liquid's independent distributors, Acme
Welding and Supply Company (Acme) and Awisco Corporation, as co-defendants. Prior to its
jury trial in the district court, Red Diamond settled its claims against Liquid but continued to
press its claims against the other co-defendants. Id. at 1003.
5. Red Diamond alleged that Liquid had conspired with Acme to terminate Red Diamond's
distributorship agreement. Id. at 1003.
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ucts in direct competition with its independent distributors. The jury
ruled in favor of Red Diamond, but the district court granted judgment
n.o.v. for Liquid on the ground that the evidence failed to support a
finding of conspiracy.7 On appeal,8 the Fifth Circuit affirmed on differ-
ent grounds and held: When the manufacturer is the source of territo-
rial or customer restraints, those restraints result in vertical market
allocations regardless of whether the manufacturer is a dual
distributor.9
In Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 10 the Supreme Court
held that although restrictive trade agreements among competitors are
patently anticompetitive and deserve per se treatment, 1 some trade ar-
6. Id. at 1004.
7. Id. at 1003. Earlier in the case, the district court had directed verdicts for the defendants
on the claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act and the Louisiana Unfair Practices Act. Although the
jury ruled in favor of Red Diamond on the Louisiana counterpart to § 1 of the Sherman Act, it
ruled for the defendants on the Sherman Act § 1 count, a seemingly inconsistent result.
8. Red Diamond's sole appeal was from the district court's judgment n.o.v. on the Louisiana
counterpart to § I of the Sherman Act, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.122 (West 1965).
9. 637 F.2d at 1004.
10. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. Trade agreements among competitors operating on the same distribution level are hori-
zontal trade restraints. Horizontal arrangements often involve agreements to divide markets geo-
graphically or to fix prices. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Ohio-Scaly Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). Seegeneral, Note,Antirust Treatment
of Intrabrand Territorial Restraints Within a Dual Distribution System, 56 TEx. L. Rav. 1486, 1486
nn.2-3 (1978).
A per se violation of the antitrust laws is an activity that is so blatantly anticompetitive in intent
and "pernicious" in effect that a court need not inquire into the reasonableness of the activity or
its actual effect on competition. The Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958), said:
[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not
only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain
to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a partic-
ular restraint has been unresonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken.
For a perceptive discussion of the per se rule, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOoRAPH No. 2,
VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPErTON 31 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Rea-
son and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Stewart &
Roberts, Viability of The Antitrust Per Se Illegality Rule: Schwinn Down, How Many To Go?, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 727 (1980); Note, supra. In Sylvania, the Court reasoned that horizontal trade
agreements exhibit blatant pernicious effects and thus deserve per se treatment. 433 U.S. at 585
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rangements between manufacturers and distributors12 are procompeti-
tive'3 and require analysis under a rule of reason approach.' 4 Because
n.28. The Sylvania decision merely affirmed the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in United States v.
Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding agreements among an association of grocers a
horizontal restraint and therefore per se illegal).
12. In the typical situation, manufacturers and distributors operate on different levels of the
distribution chain. When parties stand on different distribution levels, agreements between them
are vertical. Dual distribution systems present a unique problem because the manufacturer and
the distributor operate on the same level of the distribution chain. See notes 18-21 infra and
accompanying text.
13. The Sylvania Court recognized that vertical restrictions often enabled a manufacturer to
compete more effectively on the interbrand level, that is, with other manufacturers marketing
similar products. Because vertical restrictions reduce competition between its distributors at the
intrabrand level, manufacturers can force their distributors to concentrate their efforts on inter-
brand sales. 433 U.S. at 583. Examples of procompetitive vertical restraints include exclusive
distributorships and area of primary responsibility clauses. The appeal of using vertical restraints
to improve a distributor's interbrand sales efforts is exemplified by profit passover clauses. A
profit passover clause induces a distributor to concentrate his sales efforts in an assigned location
by requiring him, when he sells outside of his primary location, to compensate the distributor in
the area he invaded. This payment compensates the invaded dealer for his goodwill. Because the
distributor will receive a greater profit on sales inside his assigned location, he wil benefit by
improving his interbrand competitiveness, thereby increasing his sales within his assigned loca-
tion. For cases dealing with the validity of such clauses, see Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068
(2d Cir. 1980); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Scaly, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978); Response
of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,045 (S.D. Fla.), atd,
537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D.
Ill. 1972). For a general discussion on the procompetitive aspects of vertical restraints, see Schild-
kraut, Areas of Primary ResponsibiliyAnd Other Territorial Restrictions In Channels of Distribution
Under The Antitrust Laws: A Legal And Economic Analysis, I I COLuM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 509
(1975).
14. The classic formulation of the rule of reason was articulated by Justice Brandeis in Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or proba-
ble. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
Although the Sylvania Court advocated a rule of reason approach to the legality of vertical
restraints, it offered little assistance in applying the rule of reason to actual market situations. See
generally Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM L. REV. 1, 11 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and The EconomicApproack" Reletions
on The Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 13-16 (1977); Stewart & Roberts, supra note 11, at
728 n.6. The confusion generated by Sylvania centers on the Court's statement that in determin-
ing the validity of a vertical non-price restraint under the rule of reason, a court must balance the
competitive effects of the restraint on interbrand and intrabrand competition. Although the Syla-
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the Sylvania Court distinguished horizontal 5 and vertical1 6 restraints,
characterization of the restraints is a critical inquiry in analysis under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 7 Although characterization is relatively
simple in most instances,' 8 dual distribution systems 19 present a di-
lemma. On the one hand, because the manufacturer acts as a supplier
to the independent distributor, the relationship is vertical. On the other
hand, because the manufacturer, through its branch outlet,20 competes
on the same distribution level as the independent distributor, the rela-
tionship is also horizontal. Consequently, the legality of dual distribu-
tor imposed restraints is dependent on a court finding that a vertical
relationship exists between the dual distributor and independent
distributors.21
Prior to Sylvania, the courts uniformly advocated a horizontal analy-
sis for determining the legality of dual distribution restraints.22 The
nia Court pointed out that courts are fully capable of balancing intrabrand and interbrand compe-
tition, it failed to clarify their relative importance. For a better insight into the rule of reason, see
Zelek, Stem & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 13
(1980).
15. See note 11 supra.
16. See note 12 supra.
17. After Sylvania, courts must judge vertical restraints under the rule of reason, although
they still treat horizontal restraints as per se illegal. If the court finds a particular restraint is
horizontal, then it simply stops the inquiry and invalidates the restraint. On the other hand, if the
court finds that the restraint is vertical, it then must inquire into the reasonableness of the
restraint.
18. The basic distribution system involves a manufacturer who distributes his goods solely
through a series of independent distributors. Because the manufacturer operates on a different
level than its distributors, the relationship with distributors is vertical.
19. For a definition of dual distribution, see note I supra.
20. The term "branch outlet" refers to the manufacturer's wholly-owned distributor.
21. Dual distribution alone is not a violation of the antitrust laws. The existence of such a
system, however, will subject any accompanying restraint to careful scrutiny.
Any action taken by a supplier engaged in dual distribution that affects the prices at
which its customers resell its products, or inhibits the ability of those customers to com-
pete with the supplier, has the potential of being judged as a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, unless the supplier can convince the trier of fact that the decision was
motivated solely by legitimate business reasons, and not by a desire on the part of the
supplier to restrain competition.
Bondurant, Legal R ks Posed By Sherman Act Section 1; Favoritism of Owner Outlets'And Strate-
gic Pricing, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1815, 1816 (1981). For a discussion of the legal risks of dual
distribution under § 2 of the Sherman Act, see Brett, Legal Risks For Dual Distribution Under
ShermanAct Section 2, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1820 (1981).
22. See, eg., Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); Hobart Bros. Co. v.
Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Interphoto
Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), af'dper cur/am, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
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early cases relied upon United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. , in
which both horizontal and vertical territorial and customer restrictions
imposed by a manufacturer were per se violations of section 1.24 The
pre-Sylvania courts consequently approached the characterization
problem rather simplistically, focusing solely on whether the restraint
restricted competition between the independent distributor and the
wholly-owned distributor.25 Courts used this approach to invalidate
national account programs,2 6 area of primary responsibility clauses,27
and exclusive dealing arrangements. 28
Decisions since Sylvania have moved away from horizontal treat-
ment of dual distribution restraints. Although the cases immediately
following Sylvania did not expressly sanction a vertical approach, they
But see United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See generally Altschuler,
Sylvania. erticalRestraints, and DualDistribution, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 64 (1980); Note, supra
note 11.
23. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Both courts and commentators consider Schwinn a departure from
precedent. Schwinn was subsequently overruled in Sylvania. For an annotation of various
Schwinn critics, see Stewart & Roberts, supra note 11, at 729 nn.13-14.
24. 388 U.S. 365, 372-73. Because the legality of the restraints in Schwinn did not turn on
their classification as horizontal or vertical, subsequent cases prior to Sylvania did not make pre-
cise or accurate distinctions in classification. Pre-Sylvania decisions, consequently, are of dubious
authority. See Altschuler, supra note 22, at 82; Note, supra note 11, at 1494.
Although Schwinn-era cases cited Schwinn as a mandate for horizontal classification of dual
distribution restraints, the Schwinn Court classified one of the attacked restraints as vertical. See
note 31 infra and accompanying text. The Court stressed that Schwinn's dual distribution system
required the utmost cooperation between Schwinn and its distributors; therefore, the competitive
element necessary to a horizontal restraint was absent.
Unlike most pre-Sylvania cases, the court in United States v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., [1976-1] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 60,908 (D.NJ.), expressly denounced reliance on Schwinn's broad per se rule and
held that a dual distributional restraint was a horizontal market allocation. In finding the restraint
per se illegal, the court stated that "where it is shown. . . that a vertically imposed restraint is
intended to suppress horizontal competition, the court will treat the agreement as the equivalent of
a horizontal restraint of trade." Id. at 68,959.
25. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973), typifies the pre-Sylvania cases. Hobart involved a
distribution system that restricted the manufacturer's distributors from selling to certain reserved
markets and required distributors to concentrate their sales efforts in designated areas. Character-
izing Hobart and its independent distributors as co-distributors, the court classified the distribu-
tion system as a horizontal agreement among competitors to eliminate competition. Id. at 899.
26. Eg., Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 923 (1973); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), a f'd per
curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969). In a national account program the manufacturer reserves a
specific market for his own servicing. Reserved markets often include major department store
chains or government agencies. See United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
27. Eg., Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
28. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
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noticeably failed to mention the possibility of horizontal treatment.29
One of the first cases to adopt expressly a vertical analysis for dual
distribution restraints was H & B Equipment Co. v. International Har-
vester Co. 30 Relying on Schwinn, the Fifth Circuit in H & B Equipment
determined that conspiracies are horizontal restraints only when they
are carried out by a combination of distributors.31 The court held that
the conspiracy was vertical because the manufacturer and the wholly-
owned distributor were the only parties involved.32 Because the con-
spiracy did not involve any independent distributors, the possibility of
a horizontal agreement to restrain trade was absent.
The H & B Equipment test resembles the simplistic approach of the
pre-Sylvania era.33 In contrast, the Federal District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. 34
adopted a more systematic approach. The court analyzed dual distri-
bution restraints through a three part inquiry, focusing on the relative
position of the manufacturer in the distribution chain, the purpose of
the restraint, and the ability of the distributors to control marketing
decisions.31 Under the Krehl test, the restraint is vertical if the manu-
29. See Martin Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977), in which
the Third Circuit, using rule of reason analysis, upheld a distribution system favoring Chrysler-
owned dealers, but failed to mention the posssibility of horizontal treatment. See also Suburban
Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978); Altschuler, supra note 22, at 84, 92-93. Cf. Universal
Lite Distribs., Inc. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Md. 1978) (absence of actual
or potential competition under a § 2 monopolization claim supporting a nonhorizontal relation-
ship), a.ffdper curiam, 602 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1979).
30. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. Courts have interpreted Schwinn as holding that "[clonspiracies between a manufacturer
and its distributors are only treated as horizontal. . . when the source of the conspiracy is a
combination of distributors." Id. at 245. Although Schwinn's per se rule was overruled by Sylva.
nia, see note 23 supra, this aspect of Schwinn remains intact. See, eg., Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); Red Diamond
Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 102 S.Ct. 119 (1981);
Westpoint Pepperrell, Inc. v. Rea, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,341 (N.D. Cal.); Krehl v. Bas-
kin Robbins Ice Cream Co., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,806 (C.D. Cal.).
32. According to the court, "the asserted originator of the plan to eliminate H & B was the
manufacturer, which allegedly established the company store for that purpose. Consequently,
antitrust law treats the conspiracy as a vertical restraint, and those restrictions are now judged
under the rule of reason." 577 F.2d at 245-46.
33. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
34. [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,806 (C.D. Cal.).
35. In finding a vertical relationship, the Court in Krehl stated:
On the facts, the Baskin-Robbins arrangement differs decidedly from other arrange-
ments proclaimed horizontal. ... In all instances, the evidence shows that the appoint-
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facturer can unilaterally dictate marketing decisions36 and the restraint
is designed to improve interbrand competition.37
In Westpoint Pepperrell, Inc. v. Rea3 the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California took an approach similar to Krehl,
focused on the manufacturer's behavior, and stated that it would not
treat a manufacturer like a competitor as long as the manufacturer did
not act like one.39 Wesipoint Pepperrell signifies that in the post-Sylva-
nia era the courts are inclined to treat dual distribution restraints as
vertical restraints.4° Pre-Sylvania courts found horizontal relationships
when the restraint merely restricted competition between the manufac-
turer and its distributor." The Westpoint Pepperrell decision suggests,
however, that a vertical relationship exists unless the restraint com-
ment of a new area manufacturer and the designation of the territory it was to service
came from a Baskin-Robbins entity acting "from the top"; that is, acting not as a com-
petitor to the new area franchiser, but rather as an entity at the apex of the market
structure concerned with expanding the market for the Baskin-Robbins product. Such a
purpose is "vertical" in nature .... At no time did any of the existing manufacturers
have any voice in who a new area franchiser would be, or a veto over an applicant...
[and further,] the independent area franchisers do not own or control Baskin-Robbins.
Id. at 78,703. One commentator has interpreted Krehl as adopting a two part test that focused on
"the licensor's purpose in imposing the restraints, and its freedom from control by its licensees."
Altschuler, supra note 22, at 99.
36. The Krehl court was concerned with the situation presented in United States v. Topco
Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), in which a group of grocery store owners formed an association to
buy products at lower prices. In Topco the true owners or manufacturers were not the association
"acting from the top" but the individual grocers acting together as competitors in a horizontal
relationship. Accord, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
37. In Krehl the Court reasoned that a per se violation of § I is justifiable only if the ques-
tioned restraint has an adverse effect on interbrand competition. If the restraint improves inter-
brand competition, it has no anticompetitive effect and therefore is not a violation. [1979-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 62,806, at 78,705 (C.D. Cal.).
38. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,341 (N.D. Cal.).
39. Id. at 75,743. The court focused on whether the territorial restraints imposed by the
manufacturer on the distributors insulated them from competition. Westpoint's pledge not to ap-
point another distributor in the area of primary responsibility of one of its distributors was the
only possible source of insulation. The court reasoned that, under Schwinn, the pledge was not a
horizontal restraint because it was a unilateral decision on the part of the manufacturer. Id.
40. Compare United States v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., [1976-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,908 (D.
NJ.) (pre-Sylvania case classifying restraint as horizontal) with Carter Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, [1978-
1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 161,976 (E.D.N.Y.) (post-Sylvania case classifying restraint as vertical). See
Altschuler, supra note 22, at 86.
41. See, eg., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975);
Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923
(1973); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), af'dper curiam, 417 F.2d
621 (2d Cir. 1969).
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pletely eliminates competition in the market a2
Although many courts have accepted vertical treatment of dual dis-
tribution restraints, some courts4 3 and commentators"4 have been reluc-
tant to rule out horizontal treatment in certain situations. In DonaldB.
Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.45 the Fourth Circuit refused to
adopt the lower court's4 6 suggestion that Schwinn mandated per se ver-
tical treatment for dual distribution restraints imposed by a manufac-
turer.47 The court stated that proper characterization depended upon
the restraint's purpose rather than its source a.4  Like the Krehl court,
the Rice Tire court indicated that restraints imposed to improve inter-
brand competition are vertical; restraints imposed to promote price
fixing-, however, are horizontal.4 9
In Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp. 50 the Fifth
Circuit expanded the class of restraints subject to the rule of reason
with its sweeping proposition that all restraints imposed by a dual dis-
42. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,341, at 75,743.
43. See, ag., Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1979); Dough-
erty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and dismissed by sioulation, 591
F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979).
44. One commentator has suggested that vertical restrictions imposed by a dual distributor
who "retains an exclusive area or category of customers and prevents dealers from engaging in
what otherwise would constitute substantial intra-brand competition with the manufacturer" are
illegal per se or at least carry a strong presumption of illegality. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 28.
Pitofsky states that "where a supplier retains an area or class of customers exclusively for itself, it
is in effect agreeing horizontally with distributors in adjacent territories that they will not com-
pete." Id. at 32.
45. 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981).
46. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980).
47. The Fourth Circuit said:
We must reject, however, any implication arising from the district court's discussion of
Schwinn that a restraint may always be regarded as vertical if it is imposed by the manu-
facturer. Although the Supreme Court did emphasize in Schwinn that the source of the
restrictions in that case was the manufacturer, it went on to distinguish the restrictions
under consideration from "horizontal restraints in which the actors are distributors with
or without the manufacturer's participation.". . . [I]t is important to distinguish be-
tween a conspiracy among dealers and their supplying manufacturer for the purpose of
retail price maintenance that would benefit the dealers and one involving the same par-
ties but redounding primarily to the benefit of the manufacturer as a result of increased
interbrand competition. A restraint imposed by the former conspiracy would be hori-
zontal in nature andper se illegal, while one imposed by the latter would be vertical and
analyzed under the rule of reason.
638 F.2d at 16.
48. Id See note 47 supra.
49. 638 F.2d at 16. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
50. 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 119 (1981).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/12
Number 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 301
tributor are per se vertical." Rejecting the lower court's horizontal
characterization,5 2 the Fifth Circuit relied on Schwinn and held that
trade agreements between a manufacturer and its distributors are hori-
zontal only when the agreements involve a combination of distribu-
tors.5 The court interpreted Schwinn and H & B Equipment as
mandating per se vertical treatment of all restraints imposed by a
manufacturer on its distributors.5 4 Consequently, Red Diamond's alle-
gation that Liquid had imposed territorial and customer restraints
upon its distributors required that the Fifth Circuit hold the restraint to
be vertical. 5
Citing Schwinn and H & B Equoment, the court specifically rejected
Red Diamond's contention that Liquid's dual distributor status re-
quired a horizontal characterization. 56  The court reasoned that in a
dual distribution system the distributors are not the manufacturer's
competitors; rather, they act as its agents in pursuit of a common pur-
pose, the efficient marketing of the manufacturer's product.5 The
Fifth Circuit warned that if the distributors own and control the sup-
plying entity, their relationship, although it may appear vertical, is ac-
tually horizontal. 8
In Red Diamond, the Fifth Circuit fell into the trap that the Fourth
Circuit carefully avoided in Rice Tire.59 Although the Fourth Circuit
51. Id. at 1004.
52. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
53. 637 F.2d at 1004. See note 31 supra.
54. After reviewing Schwinn, see note 31 supra, the Red Diamond court quickly concluded
that "when the manufacturer is the source, the conspiracy is vertical." 637 F.2d at 1004. See notes
30-32 supra and accompanying text.
55. 637 F.2d at 1004.
56. Id. The court distinguished its earlier decision in Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilli-
land, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973), on the ground that Gilliland, a Hobart distributor, also
manufactured its own products that directly competed with certain Hobart products, thereby mak-
ing the competitive nature of their relationship more pronounced. Id. at 1005. The Hobart court,
however, also declared that Hobart's relationship with its other dealers that did not manufacture
competing products was horizontal. Id at 899. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's attempt to dis-
tnguish Hobart in RedDiamond is imprecise. See note 25 supra for further discussion of Hobart.
57. 637 F.2d at 1005.
58. Like the court in Krehl, the Fifth Circuit was concerned with the Topco situation. See
note 36 supra.
After concluding that Liquid's relationship with its dealers was vertical, the court analyzed the
agreements under the rule of reason. Because Red Diamond failed to prove any anticompetitive
effect, the court found no violation. 637 F.2d at 1007.
59. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
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correctly interpreted Schwinn as a purpose-oriented test,60 the Fifth
Circuit, misled by its earlier decision in H & B Equpment, failed to
perceive Schwinn's limitations. 6' Although the H & B Equpment court
also relied on Schwinn for the proposition that restraints are horizontal
only when imposed by a combination of distributors, it did not inter-
pret Schwinn as mandating per se vertical treatment for manufacturer
imposed restraints. Instead, the H & B Equioment decision proposed
that unilateral marketing decisions carried out by a manufacturer with-
out the involvement of its distributors are vertical restraints.62 Because
the restraints in RedDiamond involved both the manufacturer and dis-
tributors, the court's reliance on H & B Equipment was misplaced.63
The Fifth Circuit's perception of the distributors' role in a marketing
system fails to recognize the realities of the market place. 6' Although
distributors are concerned with efficient marketing of the manufac-
turer's product, they are concerned also with their own success. These
two interests do not always coincide. 65  The courts in Rice Tire,
Wesipoint Pepperrell, Krehl, and Schwinn recognized that although cer-
tain arrangements between a manufacturer and distributor are nomi-
nally vertical, they are simply attempts by competitors to divide
markets horizontally and fix prices.66 In Rice Tire the Fourth Circuit
recognized that although exclusive territorial restraints can improve in-
terbrand competition, they also permit distributors to charge monopo-
listic prices.67 Manufacturers attract distributors by offering exclusive
60. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
63. Although the decision to eliminate the dealer in H & B Equioment required no coopera-
tion between the manufacturer and other dealers, see note 32 supra, the vitality of the alleged
restraints in Red Diamond did depend upon such cooperation. 637 F.2d at 1002. Therefore, un-
like the manufacturer in H & B Equ&Oment, Liquid was acting in concert with its independent
distributors. This distinction indicates that restraints imposed by a manufacturer are not always
unilateral conduct under Schwinn. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
65. A distributor is concerned with maximizing his profit. One method of increasing one's
profit margin is inflating the price. Such activity, however, often results in less demand for the
manufacturer's product.
66. See notes 34-49 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. Because exclusive distributorships eliminate
intrabrand competition, distributors, absent intense interbrand competition, are free to maintain




distributorships.6 If the purpose of the exclusive distributorship is to
facilitate price inflation, then such arrangements are horizontal re-
straints under Rice Tire and Schwinn .69 The Fifth Circuit's test fails to
accommodate the horizontal nature of these situations.70
The Red Diamond court's failure to require an inquiry into the pur-
pose or effect of the restraint is a radical departure from previous case
law. Such an inquiry is essential to proper characterization of dual dis-
tribution restraints. KrehPs three part inquiry offers the most flexible
approach because it focuses on the individual conditions of a manufac-
turer's marketing system.7' In contrast, the Red Diamond per se ap-
proach is wholly inadequate.72
By adopting a per se approach to characterization in Red Diamond,
the Fifth Circuit has intensified the conflict surrounding the legality of
dual distribution restraints. In the wake of Red Diamond a host of di-
vergent precedents remain, ranging from per se horizontal treatment to
per se vertical treatment. 73 Until the Supreme Court addresses the is-
sue, this conflict will persist.
AS.H.
68. Manufacturers attract unwilling distributors to market their product by promising them
the larger profit margins guaranteed by exclusive territories.
69. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
70. Although the Fifth Circuit recognized the horizontal aspects of the Topco situation, see
note 58 supra, it failed to recognize that a manufacturer and an independent distributor as com-
petitors can agree to restrain trade.
71. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
72. The Fifth Circuit per se vertical rule is as simplistic as the pre-Sylvania horizontal rule.
See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
73. The current case law includes Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d
15 (4th Cir.) (purpose oriented test), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); Red Diamond Supply, Inc.
v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.) (per se vertical treatment), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 119 (1981); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977) (non-
classification rule of reason approach); Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d
894 (5th Cir.) (per se horizontal analysis), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Krehl v. Baskin-
Robbins Ice Cream Co., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,806 (C.D. Cal.) (three part inquiry into
nature of relationship and purpose of restraint).
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